The question of whether human beings have free will is an
interesting one. One view is that human beings are completely free to make
their own choices, undetermined by external factors affecting their decisions,
whether those external factors arise by human nature, laws of nature, or God.
On the opposite end, there is the view that human beings are completely
determined in their choices by these external factors and thus are not capable
of making any truly free actions. The reason why I am typing on this keyboard
is not because I am freely choosing to, but because of various physical events
leading up to this point that is causing me to do so, like a domino effect. A
very interesting question that often gets lost in this discussion, however, is
what exactly the nature of a ‘will’ is.
Often in contemporary philosophy, the will is depicted as
the mind’s steering wheel, completely neutral in its own right but able to
direct the parts of the person. The will is perceived as this thing that must
be completely free from influence in order to make free decisions. If something
causes the will to will X, then X is not willed freely. However, the will is not
a neutral faculty, but a power with an object. And by ‘object’ I mean it has a
goal or end towards which it points. For instance, in the same way that sight
is a power with its object being color in general but only sees particular
colors at any given time, the will has as its object the good in general
while being presented with particular goods at any given time. Thus, if a will
must be completely neutral in order to be free, then the will is not free
since it has an inclination to only choose particular goods.
Of course, what this implies is that we are absolutely
incapable of choosing evil for the sake of evil. But recall in my post here,
evil is not a real thing. All things that exist are to some degree good, and
evil is a privation of a due good. That we can only choose good things
is not to say that every action is perfectly good. We cannot choose evil
because evil does not exist, we can only choose goods that are lesser than
other goods. Of course, people choose to do morally reprehensible acts but they
do not do so because they view the end as evil, rather, they perceive the end
as good and thus will the act. For instance, placing my hand on a hot stove is
in no way desirable and thus I will not perform that action. Robbing a bank, however,
does have at least some degree of desirability, and thus there is
a shimmer of goodness related to it. The act is not evil per se, or absolutely.
So how are we free in relation to this conception of the
will? Well, the ‘will’ itself is not free. The attribute of freedom only
applies to choices which are a product of the will. We are beings with a
will bent towards choosing the good capable of freely choosing between various particular
goods that are presented to us. Freedom of choice is the selection of a means
towards some end. The end is always good, but one can choose between means to
achieve that end or choose some different end in general. Free choices can only
occur when deliberation is present, and deliberation can only be present in
beings with rational capacities. Thus, choices that are the product of passions
(say, immense anger caused me to punch a hole in my wall) or choices that are the
product of coercion are not free. These actions either occur too quickly
for deliberation to kick in, or the action is coerced against the will and
deliberation of the agent. To be capable of making a free choice is just to
make choices that arise out of reason and deliberation.
However, the will, like many other things that exist, is not
immune to defects. When we choose lesser goods over higher goods, this is due
to a defect of the will. In most cases, people that smoke know how
terrible smoking is to the body and that they ought to quit, but they forsake
the health of their body for some lower good, say the euphoric feeling they get
when nicotine hits their system. Many times a person knows he/she ought to do X
but instead chooses Y because Y is more convenient, provides instant
gratification, or some other reason. Thus, morally reprehensible actions are
the product of a defective will choosing lesser goods over higher goods.
