
In my previous post, I stated that the goodness of a thing
is dictated by a thing’s flourishing and well-being, and a thing’s flourishing
and well-being is dependent on its substantial form. For example, an oak tree
engages in behaviors that either promote its flourishing (such as taking in
sunlight, digging its roots deep into the ground, etc.) or hinder its
flourishing (not being able to perform these behaviors because of another tree
blocking it or choking it from the ground). Behaviors that promote its
flourishing and well-being are deemed as ‘good’ because it allows the oak tree
to perfect its form, i.e., being a good example of an oak tree. Any behaviors
that hinder it detract its ability to perfect its form and thus it becomes a
bad instance of its kind.
To be sure, the fact that it is an oak tree at all, it has at least some degree of goodness. All things
behave as to preserve their own existence—existence is a good thing. Hence, all things that exist are to some degree good. Even a sloppily drawn triangle is
to some extent a good triangle even though
it is not as good as it could be. So, if everything that exists is at its most
fundamental level good, where does evil come in?
To be sure, to lack something in general is not an evil. I
lack the ability to jump up and fly away, but this isn’t an evil because humans
aren’t naturally capable of flying. Evil is the privation of a due good. It is a lack of something that
is owed to you according to your nature. As such, evil only exists as a
privation or defect in some already existing thing. To use the triangle again,
to the extent the triangle’s angles do not
add up to 180 degrees, it is a defective, albeit good, triangle. It lacks
straight lines it ought to have. Evil, at its most fundamental level, is a
privation.
But what about things that do appear to be evil but do exist, like cancer and so forth? Here
it is important to distinguish between evil in
itself and evil for something else.
Evil in itself is a privation. However, there can be two things that are good
absolutely speaking but evil in relation to each other. Fire, since it exists, is
good. A house made of straw, since it exists, is good. But fire is an evil for a house made of straw. The two
are good absolutely speaking, but the behaviors of one (in trying to flourish
itself) might impede on the flourishing of the other. Thus, cancer engages in
behaviors that try to allow it to flourish, but it does it at the expense of
the human. It is evil for the human but
not evil in itself.
As such, a thing’s substantial form dictates what it is and
also how it ought to be. To be
lacking something it ought to have is an evil for it, but to the extent it exists
at all it is still good in some
respect. Hence, when we use words like ‘ought’ or ‘should’, we are describing
the way something should be according to its nature. A squirrel ought or should gather nuts for the winter and have four legs because that’s
just what healthy squirrels do. If we
say that it is an evil for a squirrel to be missing a leg (say due to some
animal attack) we are saying there is a way the squirrel should be, and the way
it should be is dependent on what it is in its healthiest, most natural state. Any
defect from this state is an evil.
This, of course, applies to human beings as well. Blindness
(as mentioned previously) is an evil because healthy human beings have eyes
that are capable of sight. A limp in the leg is an evil because healthy human
beings have legs that should be capable of getting them from A to B. The more we
study the behaviors of things the more we discover what constitutes its flourishing
and well-being, and thus the more we discover its substantial form. We can
therefore state what is evil for it when we have at least some grasp of its substantial
form.
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